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ABSTRACT 
The paucity of research examining family firms engaged with franchising is surprising. We 
theorize about differences in franchising behavior between family and non-family firms and the 
relative advantages accruing to family firms in this context. We also explore how selection 
processes tend to lead to family franchisor / family franchisee matches that enable a more 
effective sharing of complementary resources. The theoretical framework we develop is 
grounded in the “familiness” of the family firm as suggested by the logic of the resource-based 
view. Additionally, our theoretical analysis extends and complements the frequent use of agency 
theory as the basis for studying franchising.   
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Franchising occurs when a franchisor sells to the franchisee the right to market its branded 
products and use its business practices (Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004a). As an 
organizational form, franchising is widely recognized as an important driver of growth in 
entrepreneurial firms, principally by making products (goods or services) proximate to 
geographically dispersed customers (Combs et al., 2004a). Successful franchising benefits the 
franchisor and the franchisee. The franchisor benefits from leveraging some of the franchisee’s 
assets such as financial capital and specific local knowledge while the franchisee benefits from 
leveraging some of the franchisor’s assets including the brand, organizational routines, 
purchasing power, and managerial input. Thus, franchising is a form of inter-firm cooperation 
between organizations in which two types of entrepreneurs share tangible and intangible 
resources with the purpose of increasing performance (Combs & Ketchen, 1999b). 
Agency theory is used frequently to analyze and interpret franchising and its related 
outcomes (Combs et al., 2004a). Agency theory asserts that franchising is beneficial because it 
resolves the potential misalignment of interests between owners and managers. It is expected that 
the cost of monitoring a franchisee is less relative to the cost of monitoring hired managers. 
However, the evidence developed through agency-based franchising research is mixed, 
inconclusive, and explains little of the observed variance (Castrogiovanni, Combs & Justis 
2006a; b; Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Combs et al., 2004a; Lafontaine, 1992; Storholm & 
Scheuing, 1994). In fact, opportunistic behaviors may still occur in a franchise contract because 
of basic conflicts associated with the franchisee and franchisor’s respective goals.  
Given that agency theory arguments have not to date robustly explained franchising, 
scholars are challenged to apply complementary theoretical lens to increase our understanding of 
the franchising phenomenon (see Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; Combs & Ketchen, 1999a, 2003; 
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Combs et al., 2004a). We respond to this challenge by drawing on the resource-based view of the 
firm and family firm literature, thus extending and complementing agency theory arguments. We 
explain how the unique attributes of family firms, which exist when ownership and management 
are concentrated within a family unit with family members striving to maintain intra-
organizational family-based relatedness (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon &Very, 2007), may be especially 
valuable to franchising activities. Specifically, we theorize that “familiness,” resulting from the 
enduring interaction of the family and the business, provides a distinctive bundle of intangible 
resources that leads to high levels of value creation (Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, & Garcia-
Almeida, 2001; Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Tokarczyk, Hansen, 
Green & Down, 2007). Thus, our work addresses why and how franchise relationships that are 
built on “familiness” facilitate value creation. 
We believe that examining these questions is valuable to scholars because family firms 
appear to actively engage in franchising (Armitage & Wolfe, 2009; ICED, 2010; IFA, 2010; 
Rowlinson, 2010; Welsh & Raven, forthcoming; Wilson, 2006). Despite this, we were able to 
find only two academic studies that examine family firm issues in a franchise context 
(Kaufmann, 1999; Udell, 1973). Interestingly, in 1973 when there was still a lack of studies in 
franchising despite its rapid growth, Udell (1973: 31-32) explained that in the United States, “an 
estimated 10,000-15,000 new small and family businesses are created each year through 
franchising…Nearly 60 percent of franchisee's wives work alongside their husbands…Children, 
too, are frequently a part of the effort… a franchise is frequently a family operation.” Welsh & 
Raven (forthcoming) reported that 35 of the 81 franchises in their sample were family-based. 
Moreover, family firms engage as both franchisees (e.g., Pepsi Cola Ogdensburg Bottlers, a 
franchisee of Pepsi Cola and ‘iSold It Chatsworth’, an eBay drop-off franchise store) as well as 
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franchisors (e.g., HoneyBaked Ham Company and Café – founded in 1957 and now operating 
with 175 franchised units and Rocky Mountain Chocolate Factory – founded in 1981 and now 
operating with 323 franchised units).  
This work makes several contributions to the franchising literature. First, our analysis 
extends franchising from the traditional domain of strategic management (e.g., Combs et al., 
2004a) to the family firm context. To support this extension, we adopt a theoretical framework, 
grounded in the “familiness” of the family firm as identified via resource-based logic. This 
theoretical framework complements the use of agency theory in previous franchising research. 
Specifically, we argue that a family-firm franchisor’s inherent long-term, multi-generational 
perspective (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; James, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Zellweger, 2007) 
leads to greater commitment to cultivating the relationship with and providing the training and 
support of franchisees than is the case for non-family firm franchisors. This perspective and the 
actions derived from it mitigate potential agency issues. Furthermore, we argue that a mutual-
selection process on the part of both franchising parties increases the matching of similarly 
governed firms (i.e., both franchisee and franchisor with family governance). In turn, this 
matching provides a contextual understanding as to how both parties can benefit from 
complementary resources, reduce opportunistic behaviors, and increase the likelihood of creating 
additional value through their franchising relationship. Finally, while advancing research 
concerned with analyzing the uniqueness of family firms, we suggest that our framework may be 
applied to other types of organizations that are characterized by a dominant social group or 
collective identity – that is, any group possessing its own institutionalized practices, values, and 
behavioral norms.   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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The Franchising Activity 
Franchising occurs when a franchisor sells (or otherwise contractually binds) to a 
franchisee the right to market products under the franchisor’s brand and to use the franchisor’s 
organizational routines. In turn, the franchisee leverages its knowledge of the local competitive 
environment as the conduit for successfully applying the franchisor’s business model (Combs et 
al., 2004a). Thus, this contractually-based cooperative agreement involves heterogeneous yet 
complementary resources that firms share to enhance the value-creating ability of their combined 
resource portfolio (Combs & Ketchen, 1999b). Using combined resources facilitates more rapid 
growth and greater mitigation of deficiencies than either party could achieve autonomously. As 
such, franchising has become a vital aspect of the U.S. economy (Combs et al., 2004a). In fact, 
the number of business-format franchise establishments increased by more than 40 percent 
between 2001 and 2008. Moreover, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) anticipated that the number 
of business-format franchises would expand by 2 percent from 2008 to 2010. 
Agency theory has been used frequently to explain the franchising phenomenon (Combs et 
al., 2004a). Agency theory describes the incentive problems caused by separating ownership and 
control between a principal and agent in which the former gives authority to the latter. Agency 
costs escalate as the parties’ goals diverge and self-interested behaviors emerge. Franchising 
helps reduce the agency problem by aligning the franchisor and franchisee’s incentives to 
optimize decision-making (Combs et al., 2004a; Combs, Ketchen & Hoover, 2004b; Rubin, 
1978). However, while franchising addresses the  monitoring problem by placing motivated 
franchisee-owners in charge of outlets, it may also give rise to other problems such as free-riding 
(for a review, see Combs et al., 2004a; Lafontaine, 1992; Storholm & Scheuing, 1994). In fact, 
given that some investment-related benefits are shared among franchisees, there is the possibility 
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for franchisees to free ride on the benefits gained as a result of other units’ investments rather 
than to make investments to improve their own unit (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a, b; Combs et 
al., 2004a)  Releasing proprietary information about the franchisor’s system and methods of 
operation, failing to pay royalties in a timely manner, and not responding positively and quickly 
to the franchisor’s operations-oriented requests are examples of additional opportunistic 
behaviors franchisees might exhibit. Franchisors too may act opportunistically. For example, 
decisions to place units too close together, to terminate a contract with a franchisee in order to 
reopen a franchisor-owned unit at the same location, and failing to disclose information or to 
deliver promised services are examples of franchisor opportunistic behavior. 
In sum, agency theory arguments do not fully specify how firms engaged in franchising 
can create value and how they develop competitive advantages as the foundation for doing so. 
Accordingly, we draw from resource-based theory and family firm arguments to extend our 
understanding of how firms create value and competitive advantages when engaged in a 
franchising relationship. We suggest that resource-based arguments both complement and extend 
the insights agency theory provides about franchising.   
Resource-based Logic and “Familiness” in Franchising 
Research suggests that the resource-based view offers insight into franchising behavior, 
thus extending and complementing arguments grounded in agency theory (Castrogiovanni et al., 
2006a; Combs & Ketchen, 1999a, Combs et al., 2004a). The essence of resource-based logic 
asserts that firms differ according to their resource endowments and that resource heterogeneity 
and complementarity give rise to differential performance. Moreover, the argument is that 
bundles of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable tangible and intangible resources are 
the sources of value creation (typically through developing and using competitive advantages) 
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(Barney, 1991; Combs, Ketchen, Ireland & Webb, forthcoming; Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt & 
Holcomb, 2007).  
Consistent with resource-based arguments, firms may cooperate to gain access to critical 
and often scarce resources, thus overcoming resource-based constraints to growth over time 
(Ketchen, Ireland, & Snow, 2007). In particular, the resource-based alliance formation argument 
suggests that firms use alliances to locate and access complementary resources that, when 
configured, optimize their value-creating potential (Das & Teng, 2000; Ireland, Hitt & 
Vaidyanath, 2002; Sirmon & Lane, 2004). In other words, given that it is hard for a single firm to 
control or possess all resources needed to compete effectively, organizations form cooperative 
arrangements with other firms, of which franchising is a possible approach, to support growth 
objectives (Combs & Ketchen, 1999b; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008).1  
An increasing amount of research is being conducted to examine factors that influence 
partners’ relationships. In these efforts, resource and governance have been emphasized (see 
Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000; Podolny, 1994). For example, with respect to governance, firms with 
similar administrative systems find it easier to cooperate and trust each other while sharing 
resources (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Harrison, Hall & Nargundkar, 1993). With respect to 
resources, the insight that too much resource similarity reduces opportunities for learning and 
synergy creation has led other scholars to consider resource complementarity (Makri, Hitt & 
Lane, 2010). In this instance, a successful collaboration in which complementary resources are 
integrated can support or become the foundation for developing a competitive advantage, 
                                                            
1 Although the collaborative perspective is important, some firms may enter into partnerships seeking benefits that 
exceed their intended contribution to the relationship. That is, there are circumstances where firms engage in 
alliances not to generate bi-directional benefits through resource and knowledge flows, but primarily to seek and 
then protect uni-directional benefits. 
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particularly when collaborators share an administrative heritage (e.g., shared cultural and 
strategic backgrounds) (Chung et al., 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Sirmon & Lane, 2004).  
These relationships and outcomes likely hold in the franchising context given that 
franchising is a form of inter-firm cooperation in which the franchisee and franchisor share 
complementary resources as the foundation for creating competitive advantages and value for 
customers and other stakeholders. However, realizing the potential value of these complementary 
resources requires a governance structure that effectively guides their building and deployment. 
Sirmon & Hitt (2003) suggest that the family firm is a governance structure that enables such 
actions. A firm “may be considered a family business to the extent that its ownership and 
management are concentrated within a family unit, to the extent its members strive to achieve 
and/or maintain intra-organizational family-based relatedness, and to the extent to which the 
family unit has strong family social capital” (Arregle et al., 2007, p. 87). Moreover, this form of 
governance is prevalent in the world as it accounts for over 75% of registered companies in most 
economies (Miller, Steier & le Breton-Miller, 2003). 
Many scholars (e.g. Cabrera-Suarez et al., 2001; Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999; Manikutty, 2000; Tokarczyk et al., 2007) use the resource-based view of the firm 
as a theoretical framework for assessing the competitiveness of family firms. Resources in family 
firms are unique in that emotional attachment (as family members) and rational judgment (as 
business managers) are intertwined (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Accordingly, family firms are 
“unusually complex, dynamic, and rich in intangible resources” (Habbershon & Williams, 1999: 
3). The intangible resource of “familiness” as identified via the resource-based view is depicted 
as a source of competitive advantage that is available in family firms but is not available in non-
family firms (see Cabrera-Suarez et al., 2001; Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Habbershon & Williams, 
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1999; Habbershon, Williams & MacMillan, 2003; Pearson, Carr & Shaw, 2008). “Familiness” 
describes the distinctive bundle of resources originating from the “interaction between the 
family, its individual members, and the business” to ensure the firm’s continuity across 
generations (Habbershon & Williams, 1999, p. 11). In other words, “the interactive web of 
relationships encompassing both the family and the firm” provides family firms with an 
intangible resource base (i.e., “familiness”) that non-family firms cannot duplicate (Pearson et 
al., 2008, p. 956). 
The nature of competitive advantage that surfaces from “familiness” has been identified 
in several works. For example, family firms are characterized by a long-term orientation, 
collective identity, strong family values, extraordinary commitment, and a desire for the firm to 
survive across generations (Arregle et al., 2007; Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Pearson et al., 2008; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The extended time horizon of family firms provides the necessary 
incentives for family decision makers to invest in long-term projects (James, 1999; Zellweger, 
2007). Moreover, family firms are commitment-intensive organizations as family members 
harbor a strong attachment to the business enterprise as well as to familial relations (Chirico, 
2008; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Pearson et al., 
2008; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt & Webb, 2008; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). In fact, Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2007) demonstrated that family firms are willing to accept greater levels of risk to 
maintain ownership of the firm. The robustness of ties between family members and their firm 
has prompted some researchers to argue that founders and their heirs actually perceive the family 
firm to be a part of their own identity and their most significant creation (Miller et al., 2003).  
However, not all family firms seek to accomplish the same objectives. All desire to 
maintain family ownership; but, some (but not all) family firms are run by individuals with an 
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entrepreneurial mindset that supports innovation, change, and growth (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 
2004; Salvato, Chirico & Sharma, 2010a, b). Herein, our concern is with family firms pursuing 
growth. Sirmon & Hitt (2003) categorize these organizations as entrepreneurial family firms.  
For several reasons, entrepreneurial family firms are an appropriate sample when 
studying franchising. First, these firms are even more active in addressing conditions 
(opportunities and threats) in their external environment and to accepting risky long-term 
investments than non-entrepreneurial family firms (James, 1999; Zellweger, 2007). Franchising 
is an action by which entrepreneurial firms respond to their environment to help facilitate 
growth. In fact, franchising may fit the entrepreneurial family firm well as it is a reasonable 
approach for a small family firm to use to pursue growth (Udell, 1973). ‘iSold It Chatsworth’ has 
grown to have the best customer service of any iSold It store. The Chatsworth franchisee 
founder, Richard Chemel and his wife Helene give much of the credit to being a family firm. 
Helene says: “People know we're a family, so when they’re [customers] dealing with us, there's a 
comfort level on both (sides) of the counter” (Wilson, 2006). Likewise, franchising the family 
business may be especially appealing to the family firm because it promotes growth while 
protecting the family’s ownership (Armitage & Wolfe, 2009; Rowlinson, 2010; Udell, 1973). 
Thus, we are able to explore how “familiness” or more specifically the unique relational- and 
emotional-based context existing in family firms influences resource sharing in franchising while 
serving as a source of competitive advantage. We argue that the results of this effort advance our 
knowledge about the underlying mechanisms through which franchise relationships are built and 
sustained over time in a family firm context, thus extending our theoretical understanding of 
franchising.   
PROPOSITIONS 
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Previously, we noted that although a franchise contract seeks to align incentives between 
the franchisor and the franchisee, opportunistic behaviors may still surface. More specifically, 
because of basic conflicts in the parties' interests, one may seek to maximize its gains at the 
expense of the other party. We argue that franchising in a family-firm context can better mitigate 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviors and their attendant agency costs, resulting in greater 
success for a family-based franchise system compared to a non-family franchise system. A key 
reason for this expected outcome is that the presence of the family in a business operation and 
the resulting “familiness” focus attention on and increase commitment to the overall well-being 
and continuity of the franchising system. Indeed, although some scholars recognize that family 
firms may experience agency problems (Chrisman, Chua, Chang & Kellermanns, 2007; 
Lubatkin, Ling, & Schulze, 2007; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003), generally, family owners 
and managers’ motives (including a desire to preserve the firm for future generations) are better 
aligned for the benefit of future generations in a family firm (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & 
Buchholtz, 2001). Family members are usually altruistically dedicated to the business and tend to 
place the firm’s objectives ahead of their own. They are thus less likely to act opportunistically 
because their welfare depends on the firm’s continuation and long-term success.  
Coupled with its unique family social context, the long-term concern regarding 
survivability and success motivates and allows the family-firm franchisor to efficiently share 
resources with its franchisees. Specifically, we argue that compared to a non-family firm 
franchisor, a family-firm franchisor is more likely to use resources with the purposes of (a) 
building strong relationships with franchisees and (b) training and supporting franchisees to 
guarantee the continuity of the franchising system. Beyond efforts to effectively share resources 
with franchisees, the involvement of family firms in franchising is expected to affect partner 
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selection processes. Accordingly, we argue that when a family firm is involved in franchising, as 
either a franchisor or franchisee, an appreciation for and understanding of “familiness” 
influences these actors to select partners that also are family-firm based. This mutual selection 
process provides firms with complementary resources and a shared appreciation of effective firm 
governance, which as we later argue is a key factor in determining a family-based franchise’s 
competitive advantage. Thus, “familiness” serves as a cultural base for the family firm franchisor 
and franchisee that provides each with complementary resources, yet a shared approach to firm 
governance that is hard for non-family firm franchises to imitate. 
Building Relationships with Franchisees 
The potential advantage of a family firm results from this organizational form’s unique 
and rich social context. Social capital, which Arregle et al. (2007, p. 75) define as “the 
relationships between individuals and organizations that facilitate action and create value,” is an 
aspect of this social context. Social capital developed in the family generates particularly strong 
forms of stability, interdependence, interaction, and closure (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In this 
context, family involvement may be a source of competitive advantage and value creation 
because of the uniqueness it offers the firm in terms of interactions between individual family 
members and the business (Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Pearson et al., 2008).  
In a franchise context, a family-firm franchisor may use “familiness” to build, sustain and 
establish norms for routine interactions with franchisees over time, thus facilitating resource 
sharing while mitigating remaining agency issues (Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2009). 
These interactions allow for superior information exchange, which is a key factor in a franchise 
system’s continuity (Baucus, Baucus, & Human, 1996; Dant & Nasr, 1998). Dyer & Singh 
(1998) explain how firms that cooperate can make relation-specific investments to form 
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strategically-valuable resources that are difficult for firms operating as independent entities to 
build. Family-firm executives’ attention to family issues increases the likelihood they will seek 
to extend these proactive behaviors toward their franchisees. 
Moreover, a long-term family perspective enables a family-firm franchisor to dedicate 
additional time and effort to cultivate franchise relationships compared to a non-family firm 
franchisor. Sirmon & Hitt (2003, p. 343, 350) argue that “family firms are likely to gain more 
value from alliances than non-family firms, due to the richer social capital derived from their 
generational outlook and their patient capital,” where patient capital is defined as financial 
capital invested by the family in the business “without threat of liquidation for long periods.” In 
fact, evidence suggests that family members are induced by their strong commitment, collective 
identity and sense of trust and altruism to “actively intermingle business and family resources” to 
enhance the continuity of their business (Haynes, Walker, Rowe, & Hong, 1999, p. 238). In a 
family-firm franchise context, family members will thus be disposed to extend significant efforts 
and resources as the foundation for ensuring the firm’s survival and long-term success 
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; James, 1999; Zellweger, 2007). Survivability capital is one 
type of resource family members are willing to commit in this regard. Survivability capital is the 
set of resources family members are willing to loan, contribute, or share for the benefit of the 
family firm to preserve their family status within and outside the business (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Even during challenging economic conditions, the business is so closely tied to the family 
that family members are willing to make personal sacrifices to keep their business and the 
franchising activity viable for future generations (Haynes et al., 1999; Stewart, 2003). In turn, 
this commitment strengthens relationships with franchisees and increases trust. Franchisees 
experiencing such altruistic behavior tend to be quite judicious (Dant & Nasr, 1998) about 
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providing competitively-relevant information to the family-firm franchisor (to avoid the free 
rider problem) while simultaneously avoiding actions that might maximize their interests at the 
expense of the chain’s reputation (Combs et al., 2004b). Because franchisees participating with a 
family-firm franchisor have the benefit of being part of the family’s long-term business vision 
and intended success, agency costs will be further mitigated. 
In sum, family-firm franchisors are more likely to use their resources in order to build 
strong relationships with franchisees than non-family franchisors. Formally:  
Proposition 1a: Compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family-firm franchisor is 
more likely to use its resources with the express intention of building strong 
relationships with franchisees. 
 
Training of and Support for Franchisees 
The family firm is also seen as an organizational form with a unique working 
environment resulting from “familiness” values that foster a family-oriented workplace and 
inspires greater long-term employee commitment and loyalty (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; 
Tokarczyk et al., 2007). The trust and the friendship-based relationships between employers and 
employees that exist in family firms tend to support the emergence of groups of motivated and 
loyal employees. In turn, the actions of these groups positively influence the drive for the 
family’s (and for each individual’s) prosperity and the firm’s long-term survival. To this end, 
tangible and intangible resources are consistently invested to develop training and learning  
opportunities, many of them apprentice-like in nature, that help employees develop their skills 
(Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Scholnick, 2008). In fact, Miller et al. (2008) posit that compared to 
their non-family counterparts, family firms are more likely to train and support employees given 
their strong commitment to firm continuity and success.  
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The devotion toward employees may be extended to franchisees in a franchising context. 
Again, the strong devotion toward the family firm and the franchising activity motivates the 
family-firm franchisor to invest resources to carefully train not only internal employees –the 
future leaders– but also the franchisees with the intention of supporting the family firm over the 
long term. This commitment and the associated actions translate into additional managerial input 
and assistance to support franchisees’ activities. For instance, periodic visits to franchisees can 
be planned to solve specific problems or to identify actions to take with the purpose of improving 
the effectiveness of business processes.  
A family-firm franchisor will also tend to reduce bureaucracy and allocate more 
responsibilities to franchisees in order to enhance their feeling of belonging to the family and to 
its business (Miller et al., 2008). Such behavior further supports a friendly and informal culture 
that is based on a supportive and cohesive group in which the family-firm franchisor and 
franchisee are motivated to work together to share and use their resources to achieve common 
interests, thus mitigating agency problems. Following the above arguments, we propose that: 
Proposition 1b: Compared to a non-family firm franchisor, a family-firm franchisor is 
more likely to use its resources with the express intention of training and supporting its 
franchisees. 
 
Mutual Self-Selection Process in Family Firm Franchising  
Scholarly work has been completed with the purpose of determining how acquiring and 
managing resources affect organizational action and growth (e.g., Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003; 
Sirmon, Gove & Hitt, 2008; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). Firms generally cooperate with 
others with some form of resource relatedness (e.g., complementarity); however, sharing similar 
managerial logics is also required for the intended synergy to be fully realized. In fact, 
individuals often tend to relate with others who are most like themselves and as such, more likely  
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to understand their idiosyncratic way of thinking (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971; Webb, Tihanyi, 
Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009).  
Building on resource relatedness arguments, we propose that a mutual self-selection 
process may naturally occur between a family-firm franchisor and a family-firm franchisee, even 
potential franchisees whose hopes are to build a family-based business, given their shared 
affinity for “familiness” as well as dominant logics and collective behaviors (Chung et al., 2000; 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). These commonalities increase the likelihood that the two parties will 
signal their willingness to collaborate through their social interactions. In this respect, Podolny 
(1994) reported that firms tend to engage in transactions with similar firms while Chung et al. 
(2000) confirmed that firms of similar status are more likely to become alliance partners. 
Specifically, Chung et al. (2000, p. 4) argued that a firm tends “to seek a partner of similar status 
because doing so makes it more likely that both parties will exhibit increased levels of fairness 
and commitment” in sharing an alliance’s costs as well as its benefits. In a family-firm franchise 
system, learning barriers that franchise parties commonly experience because of cultural 
differences might thus be mitigated.  
Sharing a strong sense of dedication to support their businesses over time and generations 
is particularly valuable to both the franchisor and franchisee. Put simply, sharing such behaviors 
and objectives helps promote the success of the entire franchise system. Thus, the selection of 
family-based partners is mutually beneficial, meaning that both a family-firm franchisor and a 
family-firm franchisee will be more favorable to sharing their “familiness” and franchise with a 
family-based partner than a non-family partner. Thereby, in the selection process, a family-firm 
franchisor will tend to favor potential franchisees where the owner is or desires to be a family-
based organization. Also, a family-firm franchisor can increase the usefulness of this approach 
17 
 
by continuously franchising with family-firm franchisees, and through experiential learning, 
strengthen the value-creating potential of this family partner-selection routine. Similarly, a sense 
of family-firm pride and a better understanding of how a family organization works and the 
values on which the family business is based induce a family-firm franchisee to opt for a family-
firm franchisor that is able to support its activity through input from a shared perspective. 
Supporting this position is Kaufmann’s (1999) argument that franchisees often have families, 
suggesting that they care about issues such as retirement and succession and that their personal 
goals may extend beyond financial returns to include other outcomes such as employment 
opportunities for multiple family members (see also Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger & 
Astrachan, 2008). Given that a family-firm franchisor can easily understand such family issues 
that are consistent with its objectives and the reasons it initiated the franchising activity, the 
franchisor can easily help and support a family-firm franchisee to achieve both long-term 
financial and non-financial goals. Following the above arguments, we propose that: 
Proposition 2: A mutual self-selection process will occur between a family-firm 
franchisor and a family-firm franchisee. 
 
Competitive Advantage in a Family-Firm Franchise 
Combining and integrating related resources has the potential to create uniquely valuable 
synergy between organizations. As noted previously, sharing an administrative heritage between 
organizations facilitates this process (Sirmon & Lane, 2004). Tokarczyk et al., (2007, p. 18) 
suggest that “the intangible resources or ‘familiness’ of a firm as identified via the resource-
based view lend themselves to actualization of an effective market orientation and, subsequently, 
a competitive advantage.” Specifically, when family firms cooperate in a franchising contract, 
their shared “familiness” enables them to dance “to the same music, using similar steps” (Makri 
et al., 2010, p. 606), because family members have similar understandings of the challenges 
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family firms face and are familiar with various coping and adaptation mechanisms. Also, their 
shared family-based status facilitates communication, coordination, and cooperation, which in 
turn helps each party understand the value of its unique but complementary set of resources, thus 
increasing the efficiency of resource-sharing efforts.  
Hence, learning barriers that franchise parties usually experience because of cultural 
differences are reduced within a family-firm context, and a contextual understanding that 
facilitates redeployment and use of different but complementary resources can be promoted 
(Capron, Mitchell & Swaminathan, 2001). In these instances, effectively using and managing 
complementary resources becomes easier because of the firms common way of thinking that 
reduces the possibility of misinterpretation and improves mutual understanding between parties. 
Such cohesion increases the willingness to invest more effort to support each other. Research 
supports that cohesiveness between organizations (Gulati & Singh, 1998) positively impacts 
knowledge disclosure (Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 2001), knowledge integration (Tiwana, 
2008) and reciprocal assistance (Hansen, 1999).  
Moreover, the commitment of each family franchise partner to the franchise system may 
increase because of the utility that family firms place on non-economic factors (Astrachan & 
Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Specifically, the importance of socioemotional 
wealth –the “non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, such as 
identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty” 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, p. 106), promotes behavior that enables the system to emphasize and 
invest for long-term success with less risk of another party rejecting or undercutting such 
initiatives. Indeed, the value the parties derive from continuity make long-term actions (such as 
strengthening customer relationships and embracing innovations) originating at either the 
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franchisor or franchisee level more likely. Also, the importance of socioemotional wealth to the 
family participants may help the parties prevent opportunism even more because such behavior 
runs counter to deeply ingrained norms (Arregle et al., 2007). In fact, some scholars refer to 
family firms as high trust organizations “because they are governed by underlying informal 
agreements based on affect rather than on utilitarian logic or contractual obligations” (Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001, p. 82). When trust exists, the firm does not fear its 
partner’s actions in that the partners can depend on each other and use their shared “familiness” 
to achieve a common purpose (Ireland et al., 2002). In a franchising context, trust suggests that a 
partner’s actions will meet expectations, including the absence of opportunistic behaviors. This 
trust is enhanced by a mutual respect for a commitment to and the valuing of socioemotional 
wealth. 
In summary, compared to a non-family firm franchise context, relationships will be less 
likely to result in behavior that pursues self-interest at the expense of the other party’s interests in 
a family-firm franchise context. Indeed, the family-firm franchise context is likely to be one 
through which cooperative behaviors are the foundation for using complementary resources to 
achieve long-term success for each party and the franchise relationship. Because of family status 
similarity, the resource-based complementarities between family parties leads to an output rooted 
in a unique configuration of joint intangible resources (i.e., “familiness”)--family social capital, 
survivability capital, patient capital, emotional commitment and so forth–that are difficult to 
imitate. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the shared “familiness” between family 
franchise parties provides a cultural background and intangible resource base that is more likely 
to lead to competitive advantage compared to non-family franchise parties. Following the above 
arguments, we propose that: 
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Proposition 3: Competitive advantage is more likely to be achieved in a family-firm 
franchise context compared to a non-family firm franchise context. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Firms often cooperate to develop synergies as a foundation for creating value. Such 
collaborations provide access to different resources that cannot be generated internally. The 
franchising contract enables each franchise partner to gain access to different, yet 
complementary resources, thus fostering learning and growth (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Ireland, 1991). However, in some instances, either the franchisor or franchisee might choose to 
engage in self-interested resources flows. When this happens, the party acting in its own best 
interest gains more resources than it contributes to the partnership. While a franchising firm may 
benefit from self-interested behaviors in the short run, these behaviors may cause it to incur 
future sanctions (e.g., higher franchising fees, loss of potential partners) when seeking additional 
franchising relationships. In this paper, we argue that engaging in transactions with family firms 
where “familiness” values are shared has the potential to help mitigate agency costs. This is 
especially relevant today as individuals can access an extensive amount of knowledge about a 
potential partner’s past franchising behaviors and use that knowledge when evaluating the 
possibility of forming a franchising relationship with a given entity. 
Thus, to extend our understanding of the franchising phenomena and the theories on 
which the extant franchising research is based, we examined the family firm within the 
franchising context. Our primary research objective is to develop theoretical arguments to 
explain why and how a family-firm franchise context may be superior (in terms of value creation 
potential) compared to non-family based franchising. Moreover, we suggest that family 
involvement in franchising activity may also mitigate the possibility of agency problems.  
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To achieve our objective, we first argued that a family-firm franchisor uses more 
resources for and devotes more attention to the continuity and hence the survivability of the 
franchising activity than a non-family firm franchisor. This attention is exemplified by stronger 
relationships with and providing additional training and support for franchisees. Next, based on a 
family status similarity between family-firm franchise parties, we theorized that a mutual self-
selection process occurs between the family-firm franchisor and the family-firm franchisee, 
leading to a context in which resource complementary and shared managerial logic exist. 
Accordingly, when both franchise parties are family firms, their family status similarity resulting 
from their shared “familiness” provides a contextual understanding of how to benefit from 
complementary resources, shared levels of commitment and similar valuing of socioemotional 
wealth, thus leading to a competitive advantage. We present our primary theoretical arguments in 
Table 1. 
-Insert Table 1 about here- 
Interestingly, the mutual self-selection process between family franchise parties that is 
theorized herein seems to find some practical evidence in the business world—a world in which 
family franchises clearly signal their intention to franchise with other family firms given their 
common values and understandings of family issues. For instance, Frank Crail, owner of the 
family firm franchisor, Rocky Mountain Chocolate, recognizes that franchisees are the source of 
his company's growth. In particular, typically (although not exclusively) Rocky Mountain targets 
potential franchisees with family ambitions similar to those that the founder had when he opened 
his first store (Armitage & Wolfe, 2009). Hence, most Rocky Mountain Chocolate’s franchisees 
are family-owned. Frank Crail explains “I think everybody would like to own a chocolate store. 
And we provide that business opportunity.” He also adds “They [potential franchisees] simply 
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want to run a family business, in a community [in which] their families can grow and flourish” 
(Armitage & Wolfe, 2009). Similarly, information reported on the International Franchise 
Association’s Web site appears to suggest that the HoneyBaked Ham Company and Café family-
firm franchisor mainly directs its attention towards potential family-firm franchisees, arguing to 
be very close to their family needs. The company presents itself in the following way: “The 
HoneyBaked franchise is a truly exiting ‘quality of life’ franchise opportunity…[that] offers a 
comfortable balance between work and family life. Our stores are typically open from 10 AM to 
6 PM, Monday through Saturday. You can be sure you have quality time to spend with your 
loved ones. After all, we're a family business too” (IFA, 2010).  
Our work makes several contributions to the franchising and family firm literatures. First, 
we introduce the family firm as an organizational form with the potential to create value in the 
franchising context. Additionally, our analysis offers practical examples of successful family 
franchises. Given this, we developed propositions to advance our understanding of how 
franchisor/franchisee relationships can be built and sustained in a family firm context to not only 
mitigate agency problems but to also generate competitive advantages. In particular, we extend 
and complement the use of agency theory in franchising research by adopting a theoretical 
framework that is grounded in the “familiness” of the family firm as identified via resource-
based logic, and depicted as a mechanism to curb agency costs. As mentioned above, we 
theorized that a competitive advantage is more likely to be developed when the franchise parties 
have a family status similarity as well as complementary resources because a family status 
similarity facilitates communication between family franchise businesses and, subsequently, the 
effective use of complementary resources. Thus, family firms considering franchising tend to 
seek franchisees that are family firms with whom they can easily relate, understand, and interact. 
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We also address the partner-selection process on the part of potential franchisees. As a result, the 
theorizing presented herein offers a more fine-grained assessment of the relationship between 
partner firms and the type of governance structure needed to realize the highest value from a 
franchise partnership. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first effort to explore 
franchising in a family-firm context from both the franchisor and franchisee’s point of views. 
A third contribution flowing from this work deals with the possibility that our analysis 
may facilitate scholarly efforts that might be undertaken for the purpose of better understanding 
competitive actions and patterns involving other organizational forms. The reason for this is that 
potentially many of the features of the relationships that occur in a family-firm context could 
generalize to other organizations (see Arregle et al., 2007). In fact, the family-firm 
franchisor/franchisee relationships we describe herein may be similarly developed in other types 
of organizations that are characterized by intense social structures and strong emotional 
commitments, such as high-reliability organizations (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999) and 
not-for-profit organizations (Valentinov, 2008). Specifically, to some extent, entrepreneurial 
family franchisors/franchisees might be more similar to non-family franchisors/franchisees that 
are dominated by a social group, rather than a non-entrepreneurial family firm. As such, the 
entrepreneurial family firm possesses hybrid attributes. Thus, arguments presented herein may be 
generalizable to other ownership forms that are heavily influenced by a single homogeneous 
social group.  
However, this work is not without limitations. First, we address entrepreneurial family 
firms--those pursuing growth. However, for other types of family firms, franchising, in either 
capacity, would be problematic. For example, we argue that shared family status between family 
franchise parties facilitates effective use of complementary resources. However, the similarity 
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between entrepreneurial family firms and non-entrepreneurial family firms is not very high. 
Second, we do not consider the stage of succession of family firms; that is, we do not consider 
how many generations have been leaders of the firm. Research suggests that succession events 
have important effects on family firms. Finally, we assume that external stakeholders view 
family firms positively (Miller et al., 2008) in spite of preliminary evidence suggesting that 
external parties tend to view the family firm as an unprofessional and low-performing 
organization (see Granata & Chirico, 2010).  
Our current efforts as well as its limitations suggest the need for additional scholarly work 
to further examine the franchising phenomenon. Specifically, future work may be needed to 
better understand how various types of family firms engage in franchising as well as how value-
creating franchise relationships in a family firm context can be nurtured during a time of 
succession. Additionally, our suggestion that a family-firm franchisor can continuously franchise 
with family-firms, thus strengthening its family partner-selection routine while expanding its 
franchising competence, requires empirical testing.  
Another avenue of future research concerns the need to investigate how a family-firm 
context versus a non-family firm context can lead to competitive advantages based on the 
parties’ similar or different expectations. We argue that competitive advantages are more likely 
to be formed when both franchise parties are family firms. Similar long-term orientations and 
expectations about outcomes are conditions supporting this expectation. Future studies may 
assess interactions and outcomes when only one party to a franchise contract is a family firm. 
Propositions presented herein imply that opportunistic behavior is the least likely when both 
parties to a franchise contract are family firms and the most likely when neither party is a family 
firm. These proposed expectations may suggest the possibility that franchising is a more 
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‘familiness-friendly’ form of expansion for firms to pursue compared to other growth 
mechanisms such as mergers and acquisitions and various collaborative relationships including 
alliances and joint ventures. Given this possibility, additional questions surface such as how 
would each family franchise party signal its intentions of considering the possibility of forming a 
franchising relationship? And, to what extent are specific aspects and characteristics of family-
firm franchisors/franchisees applicable or transferable to other franchisor/franchisee ownership 
forms? In such cases, would the mutual self-selection process work for non-family firm 
franchises the same way?2 Exploring questions such as these could yield interesting and nuanced 
contextual insights about franchising.  
Implications for Practice 
Our analysis also has the potential to inform effective organizational practices. First, we 
argue and document that family franchises exist and that they are important and successful given 
their relational-based unique resources that lead to competitive advantages. Hence when forming 
a cooperative arrangement, selecting a family firm as the partner may positively affect the 
outcomes produced by the franchising-based collaboration.  
Second, effective resource management processes are essential to forming and 
successfully deploying competitive advantages in both family and non-family firms. Often, firms 
cooperatively use related resources to form advantages. However, given the importance of 
complementary, yet distinct resources as sources of competitive advantages (Harrison et al., 
1991), both family and non-family firm leaders should consider resource complementarity when 
engaging in franchising.   
                                                            
2 We thank the two anonymous reviewers for these helpful insights. 
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Also, the franchisor and franchisee should recognize the importance of forming 
consensus on desired ends when engaging in franchising. As a cooperative venture, firms 
involved with franchising must emphasize values such as trust and respect as the foundation for 
forming and pursuing shared goals. Without shared goals, dissolution of the franchise contract is 
more likely. Accordingly, franchise relationships need to be “multifaceted so that there is always 
room for revision or negation” and “participants in the dialogue should be able to express their 
own ideas freely and candidly” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 25). Learning from family-firm 
franchisor/franchisee relationships may be helpful to achieve this goal. Accordingly, franchisor 
and franchisee leaders should focus on developing a culture that encourages and rewards 
behaviors that simultaneously serve the interests of both franchising parties. 
In conclusion, we hope that this research informs, extends and encourages future work 
regarding family firms within the franchising phenomenon.  
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Table 1: Franchising in Family Firms  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical Arguments Propositions 
(P) 
 
a. First, we argue that a family-firm franchisor uses 
more resources for and devotes more attention to the 
continuity and hence the survivability of the 
franchising activity than a non-family firm franchisor 
by: 
‐ developing  stronger relationships with franchisees; 
‐ providing additional training and support for 
franchisees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P1a 
P1b 
 
b. Second, based on a family status similarity between 
family-firm franchise parties, we theorize that a 
mutual self-selection process occurs between the 
family-firm franchisor and the family-firm franchisee, 
leading to a context where resource complementary 
and shared managerial logic exist, thus mitigating 
opportunistic behaviors.  
 
 
P2 
 
c. Third, when both franchise parties are family firms, 
their family status similarity resulting from their 
shared “familiness” provides a contextual 
understanding of how to benefit from complementary 
resources, shared levels of commitment and similar 
valuing of socioemotional wealth, hence leading to a 
competitive advantage that is hard for non-family 
firm franchises to imitate.  
 
  
P3 
